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I. INTRODUCTION
‘My daughter told me there was a car on fire with people in it. I looked out 
and saw a young man who had lost control of himself trying to push his 
way into the burning car. When I got to the car he had fallen down and he 
was on fire. The shelling was ongoing and I dragged him to an alley and 
tried to talk to him, but he couldn’t talk. One of his eyes had burned away 
and he was horribly injured.’
* Michigan State University College of Law, J.D. anticipated May 2010 with an 
International Law concentration; Note and Comment Editor of Michigan State University 
College of Law’s Journal of International Law; B.S., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 
2005, with a double major of Political Science and International Studies. 
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According to [Muhammad] al-Sharif, he and the man were stuck in the 
alley for 90 minutes as the shelling continued, and because they feared 
Israeli snipers in the area. Once the shelling subsided, he and two young 
men carried the wounded man to a neighbor’s car and then drove him to 
al-Shifa hospital. At 2:30 p.m. al-Sharif returned to the car and found that 
it had partially melted and the gas tank had exploded.  
Around that time, Fathi Sabbah also arrived at the car, where he met a 
neighbor and an ambulance that had come to take the dead bodies away for 
burial. In the smoking wreckage, he said, they found only a few bones of 
the four occupants. A piece of a skull and some teeth lay next to the 
vehicle, al-Sharif said.1
On January 15, 2009, Mohammad al-Haddad and four other family 
members entered their 1996 Volkswagon Golf after Israel announced a 
temporary unilateral ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.2  Trusting that no attacks 
would take place, the family started to drive away, but less than 100 meters 
later their car was hit.3  Mohammad flew from the car, and the above stated 
events took place after he ran back to the car to attempt to save his family.4
Mohammad’s mother Ihsan, his father ‘Uday, his twenty-four year-old 
brother Hatim, and his fourteen year-old sister Ala’a all died in the attack.5
The events above are graphic and tragic, not to mention difficult to 
stomach, but unfortunately, death and destruction are nothing new to the 
residents of the Gaza Strip of the Palestinian Territories.  War and turmoil 
have been all too familiar in the region as the conflict between the 
Palestinians and Israelis has continued for over sixty years now, ever since 
the formation of the State of Israel in 1948.  What is new, however, is the 
use of white phosphorus as a weapon by the Israeli Defense Forces (“IDF”) 
in the Gaza Strip.  What is even more significant is the fact that this white 
phosphorus was made in the United States.6
Israel has the strongest army in the Middle East and one of the strongest 
in the world.  No army gains its strength on its own, though.  Like most 
other nations who develop and maintain armies, Israel manufactures some 
of its own weapons and imports a great deal of others.  War makes money.  
Military trade is big — maybe even now more than ever — and Israel is no 
 1. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, RAIN OF FIRE: ISRAEL’S UNLAWFUL USE OF WHITE 
PHOSPHORUS IN GAZA 36–37 (2009), http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports 
/iopt0309web.pdf (footnote omitted). 
 2. Id. at 37. 
 3. Id. at 37. 
 4. Id. at 37. 
 5. Id. at 37. 
 6. Id.
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exception.7  Given the significant impact of this realm of trade among 
nations, numerous national and international laws exist that govern these 
business dealings.  International conventions, such as the Chemical 
Weapons Convention, and domestic laws, such as the U.S. Arms Export 
Control Act in the United States, all contain regulations and restrictions on 
what can be sold, who it can be sold to, and what procedures must be 
followed in order for the dealings of countries, companies, or nations to be 
legal. 
This Paper is a response to Human Rights Watch’s request that the 
United States “[i]nvestigate whether Israel used U.S.-manufactured white 
phosphorus in Gaza in violation of international humanitarian law or any 
arms transfer agreements or policies.”8  It will begin by outlining various 
international laws and addressing the debate of whether white phosphorus 
use is permitted under such laws.  This Paper then intends to compile 
evidence from various reliable sources that white phosphorus manufactured 
by U.S. companies was indeed used by the IDF.  Following this 
groundwork, this Paper will delve into an assessment of whether the manner 
in which white phosphorus was used violated international humanitarian 
law as well as U.S. domestic law.  More specifically, this assessment 
addresses the question of whether the sale and export of American made 
white phosphorus to a buyer whose use went against U.S. policies violated 
the Arms Export Control Act or other relevant laws. 
As a disclaimer, this Paper does not intend to ignore the Israeli injuries 
resulting from Palestinian Qassam rockets.  The taking of innocent lives on 
either side is unacceptable.  However, this Paper is focusing on the legality 
of white phosphorus use in warfare and whether a manufacturing or 
exporting country can be held liable for the use of its weaponry when the 
use violates international or domestic law.  Given that Israel was the only 
party to this conflict to have been found using white phosphorus, its actions 
will be the focus of this Paper. 
 7. Khaled Diab, Profits of War, GUARDIAN NEWS & MEDIA, Jan. 11, 2009, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/jan/11/gaza-israel-palestine-military-
equipment.   
According to the Israel Export and International Co-operation 
Institute, security and homeland security exports reached $3bn in 
2005. In 2007, Israel overtook Britain to become the world’s 
exporter, selling a total of $4bn in arms.  On top of that, since the 
bursting of the dot-com bubble, Israel has boosted its military 
spending, partly to help salvage high-tech firms. Last year, proved to 
be yet another record year, with the country’s defence budget 
subsuming a massive 16% of government spending and 7% of GDP. 
Add to that, the average $3bn in military aid which Israel receives 
from the United States each year, and you have a truly staggering 
economic dependence on the way of the gun.   
Id. 
 8. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 10. 
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II. GAZA’S EVENTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
A. Operation Cast Lead 
On December 27, 2008, Israel began what became a twenty-two day 
operation by the name of Operation Cast Lead.9  One of the purposes of this 
Operation, as portrayed in the media, was “to enforce a ceasefire agreement 
with Hamas on Tel Aviv’s terms.”10  Media sources initially reported that 
the attack was in response to an initial violation of the ceasefire a few days 
before the Operation began, but only a few days later, the media corrected 
itself after it realized that Israel had been planning the Operation for 
months.11  Defense Minister Ehud Barak ordered the IDF to prepare for the 
attack more than six months before the actual Operation was put into 
effect.12  U.S. sources came to realize the validity of this fact when Rick 
Sanchez decided to have the international desk at CNN fact check 
statements made by an independent politician, Mustafa Barghouti, just the 
day before on CNN.13  Mr. Barghouti had stated that Israel broke the 
ceasefire, not the Palestinians.14  Quoting U.S. News and World Report and 
the Guardian, among other sources, Mr. Sanchez confirmed that Mr. 
Barghouti’s comments were indeed correct and that Israel broke the 
ceasefire. 
After six months of careful planning and strategizing, the Israeli Cabinet 
finally put the Operation to a vote and on December 24, 2008, unanimously 
agreed that the attacks should take place.15  Within seventy-two hours, the 
attacks were underway.16  For three full weeks, Israel attacked Palestinians 
in the Gaza strip, the first week strictly with air strikes, but the second and 
third weeks included ground incursions.  At the end of three weeks, 
Palestinian homes were destroyed, schools and hospitals burned, and most 
importantly, over 1,300 Palestinians killed, at least 300 of them children, 
 9. Id. at 1. 
 10. The Nuke Strategy Wonk, Israeli Operation Cast Lead is a “Thunder Run” Into 
Gaza, Jan. 13, 2009, http://scisec.net/?p=107. 
 11. Barak Ravid, Operation “Cast Lead”: Israeli Air Force Strike Followed Months 
of Planning, GLOBAL RES., Dec. 28, 2009, http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php? 
context=va&aid=11521. 
 12. Id.
 13. See e.g., Henry Siegman, Israel’s Lies, 31 LONDON REV. BOOKS 3 (2009), 
http://www.lrb.co.uk/v31/n02/henry-siegman/israels-lies; YouTube, CNN Confirms Israel 
Broke Ceasefire First, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KntmpoRXFX4 (last visited Feb. 
5, 2010) [hereinafter Breaking Ceasefire]. 
 14. Breaking Ceasefire, supra note 13. 
 15. Ravid, supra note 11. 
 16. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 1. 
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and 5,000 others injured.17  On the Israeli side, Palestinian Qassam rockets 
killed seven Israeli civilians in southern Israel near Sderot.18
After the attacks ended, human rights groups and reporters were finally 
let into Gaza, as they were prevented from doing so while the fighting was 
underway.19  There, they observed the destruction first hand.  After 
numerous discussions with locals, investigators with these groups were 
repeatedly told about how the IDF used a chemical incendiary that resulted 
in a number of casualties.  Surviving Palestinians showed their chemical 
burns and the remnants of the chemical still burning in the streets of Gaza 
up to two weeks after the conflict ended.20  Doctors discussed burning 
wounds that they could not stop from burning until the flesh was destroyed 
— a chemical that soon was identified as white phosphorus. 
B. White Phosphorus Use  
White phosphorus has a number of uses within the military realm.  As 
Human Rights Watch (“HRW”) explained:  
White phosphorus is a chemical substance dispersed in artillery shells, 
bombs, rockets, or mortars, used primarily to obscure military operations 
on the ground.  When released upon ground contact or air-burst, it emits a 
dense white smoke that militaries use to screen the movement of troops.  
The smoke also interferes with infra-red optics and weapon-tracking 
systems, thus protecting military forces from guided weapons such as anti-
tank guided missiles.21
Therefore, it is not unusual to find white phosphorus manufactured in a 
number of places across the globe.  It is accepted as a chemical used within 
warfare in a select number of ways.  Also known as “Willy Pete,” white 
phosphorus is namely used for screening, signaling, or incendiary 
purposes.22
 17. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, FUELING CONFLICT: FOREIGN ARMS SUPPLIES TO 
ISRAEL/GAZA 5 (2009) http://www.amnestyusa.org/countries/israel_and_occupied_territories 
/fuellingconflict.pdf.  
 18. Id. at 17 (“The military publication Jane’s Terrorism and Security Monitor has 
described the ‘Qassam’ rockets as: ‘inaccurate, short-range and rarely lethal.’”).
 19. See generally, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL,
supra note 17. 
 20. See generally, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL,
supra note 17. 
 21. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 2. 
 22. GlobalSecurity.org, White Phosphorus, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military 
/systems/munitions/wp.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2010).   
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Israel has repeatedly used white phosphorus in its military attacks. The 
IDF used white phosphorus in Lebanon in 1982, 1993, and 2006.23  Israel 
used two specific types of white phosphorus shells in Gaza in this latest 
attack.24  One type was the 155mm artillery shell, most notably recognized 
by its light green canister casing with the label of “WP Canister.”25  This 
shell is comprised of four metal liners that together, contain 116 felt wedges 
that have been soaked in white phosphorus.26  Once the shell explodes, the 
felt wedges scatter in the air, the exposure to oxygen causing these wedges 
to immediately ignite and burn.27  The second type of shell is the 120mm 
mortar shell.28
There are two ways to use such white phosphorus bombs.29  One is to 
explode the bombs upon impact with the ground, and the second is to 
airburst the bomb while it is still flying in the air.30  The first provides the 
military with a limited area of a thick smokescreen, while the latter ignites 
in the air, covering a larger area.31  Given the nature of the second use of a 
phosphorus bomb, anything on the ground, including homes and civilians, is 
in danger of exposure to the phosphorus chips and hence in danger of 
catching fire.32  In other words, although white phosphorus is intended to act 
as a smoke screen, imprecise use of white phosphorus can result in exposure 
and harm to humans.  “When white phosphorus comes into contact with 
people or objects, it creates an intense and persistent burn, emitting heat and 
absorbing liquid. . . . [W]hite phosphorus can also penetrate the body and 
poison organs.”33  If the person survives the burns, long-term effects include 
kidney failures and infections.34  Israel used this second method.35
 23. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 12; see generally Matthew Weaver, 
White Phosphorus: Israel Fires Artillery Shells into Gaza, GUARDIAN NEWS & MEDIA, Jan 3, 
2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jan/03/gaza-israel-attacks-artillery; see also
Robert Marquand, Gaza: Israel Under Fire for Alleged White Phosphorus Use, CHRISTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 14, 2009, http://csmonitor.com/2009/0114/p07s01-wome.htm?print=true.   





 29. Amira Hass, Is Israel Using Illegal Weapons in Its Offensive on Gaza?,




 33. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 11. 
 34. Id. at 11 (citing Identification of Explosive White Phosphorus Injury and Its 
Treatment, signed by Dr. Gil Hirshom, Head of the Trauma Unit, Headquarters of the Chief 
Military Medical Officer, Ref. Cast Lead SH9 01293409). 
 35. See e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra
note 17; Hass, supra note 29. 
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Additionally, Israel used white phosphorus in three different situations.  
First, the IDF used white phosphorus in densely populated areas,36 air-
bursting the chemical over civilian shelters such as homes and apartment 
buildings, as well as directly striking al-Quds Hospital, the main United 
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East 
(“UNRWA”) compound where 700 civilians were taking shelter, and the 
U.N. Beit Lahiya school.37  A number of people were killed, many more 
injured, and over $3.7 million worth of medical supplies were destroyed.38
The second manner in which IDF soldiers used white phosphorus was as an 
obscurant on the edge of residential neighborhoods, “substantial amounts of 
white phosphorus land[ing] up to a few hundred meters inside residential 
areas, killing at least six civilian[s] and wounding dozens.”39  Finally, white 
phosphorus was used along the 1948 armistice line, “perhaps to screen troop 
movements,” to eliminate hiding areas for Palestinians, and to detonate 
landmines.40
III. WHITE PHOSPHORUS USE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
A. Relevant International Treaties and Conventions  
The U.N. Charter states that its members “shall settle their international 
disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and 
security, and justice, are not endangered.”41  As much as the world would 
hope that all states could handle their disputes by peaceful means, the reality 
is that states go to war and people are killed.  However, regardless of the 
necessity of war, states must still follow laws of war that help to minimize 
injustices and civilian casualties.  Of particular relevance here are 
restrictions placed on the types of weapons used in war and the manner in 
which they can be used.      
With regard to white phosphorus, this chemical is not specifically named 
as a prohibited chemical in any international laws or conventions.  
However, a number of international agreements govern how a country uses 
weapons, and these agreements are essential to the assessment of the 
legality of the manner in which Israel used white phosphorus in Gaza.  
Namely, they are the First Additional Protocol of 1977 to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions (“Protocol I”), the 1907 Hague Protocol III of the Convention 
on Certain Conventional Weapons, and the 1907 Hague Regulations.42
Although generally a state must have ratified a treaty in order for it to be 
 36. Hass, supra note 29.  
 37. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 3–4. 
 38. Id. at 3–4. 
 39. Id. at 4. 
 40. Id. at 4. 
 41. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
 42. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 60.  
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binding on that party, HRW suggests that the relevant provisions in the 
above mentioned treaties are customary international law.43  It appears that 
their position is indeed valid, as numerous international and domestic 
organizations as well as courts recognize that “the principles of distinction 
and proportionality and the prohibition on causing superfluous injury or 
unnecessary suffering” are all considered to be part of customary 
international law as is the prohibition on chemical and biological weapons.44  
Therefore, regardless of whether a state has ratified the above-mentioned 
treaties, it is bound by those rules of law when in an armed conflict.  The 
only question is whether white phosphorus falls under these customary 
international laws, and if not, if there are any treaties or laws that would 
otherwise bind the involved countries.   
1. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 
12, 1949 
In 1977, the United Nations adopted its first protocol to the Geneva 
Conventions relating to the protection of victims of international armed 
conflicts.45  Article 51 sections 4 and 5 of the Protocol titled “Protection of 
the civilian population” prohibit indiscriminate attacks, which are:   
4. . . . (a) [T]hose which are not directed at a specific military 
objective; (b) those which employ a method or means of combat which 
cannot be directed at a specific military objective; or (c) those which 
employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be 
limited as required by this Protocol; and consequently, in each such case, 
are of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects 
without distinction.
  
 43. Id. at 60.  
 44. International Conferences of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent, Use of 
Nuclear, Biological or Chemical Weapons: Current International Law and Policy 
Statements, Mar. 3, 2003, available at 
http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/5KSK7Q; see also Legality of the Threat or 
Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 226, at 257–58 (“The 
Nuremberg International Military Tribunal had already found in 1945 that the humanitarian 
rules included in the Regulations annexed to the Hague Convention IV of 1907 ‘were 
recognized by all civilized nations and were regarded as being declaratory of the laws and 
customs of war’ (Trial of the Major War Criminals, 14 November 1945–1 October 1946, 
Nuremberg, 1947, Vol. 1, p. 254)”); Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval 
Operations NWP 9 (Rev. A), FMFM 1–10, Oct. 1989, Ch. 10, available at 
http://www.history.navy.mil/library/online/nwp9_commanderhand.htm (stating the U.S. 
position that “[b]oth customary and conventional international law prohibits the “first use” of 
lethal chemical weapons in armed conflict”). 
 45. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Dec. 7, 1978, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter Protocol I]. 
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5. Among others, the following types of attacks are to be considered as 
indiscriminate: (a) an attack by bombardment by any methods or means 
which treats as a single military objective a number of clearly separated 
and distinct military objectives located in a city, town, village or other area 
containing a similar concentration of civilians or civilian objects; and (b) 
an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, 
injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, 
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military 
advantage anticipated.46 
In other words, Part 4 says if an attack is not aimed at a specific military 
target, if the method used cannot specify its targets, if the technique used 
affects much more than the original intended target, or if the method used 
was expected to injure both military and civilians alike, then that attack is 
held as indiscriminate.  Part 5(b) provides the principle of proportionality — 
the idea that a military’s actions and objectives must be proportional to the 
resulting damage from the operation.  Almost every alternative definition 
mentioned in this provision encompasses the events that took place in Gaza; 
therefore, the attacks on Gaza were in fact indiscriminate. 
Before moving forward, it must be restated that Gaza is one of the most 
densely populated areas in the world.  Therefore, even targeting a specific 
man in a building will result in the deaths of many others when the method 
is an air strike rather than an individual sniper taking out the individual 
insurgent.  Given the limited space in Gaza, numerous Palestinian families 
live in each individual building.  Additionally, white phosphorus use has 
two primary uses as mentioned previously.  Israel chose the second 
smokescreen covering a much larger area. 
That being said, we now turn to the definitions in Article 51.  The first 
part looks at whether the attacks were aimed at a specific military objective.  
Israel takes the position that it was aiming to target Palestinian insurgents 
who were firing Qassam rockets into Israel.  Assuming that this was indeed 
their military objective, the problem is that the means utilized by the IDF, 
which goes into Part (b) of the definition, could not specifically aim to 
fulfill that objective.   
In addition, Part (c) of Article 51(4) states that methods that cannot 
narrowly aim at the target cannot be used and are considered indiscriminate.  
Here, human rights organizations turn to the IDF’s specific decision to use 
white phosphorus rather than alternative, less harmful and equally effective 
means, such as 155mm smoke projectiles.47  These projectiles have the same 
ability to create smokescreens but do not result in the same incendiary 
effect,48 hence eliminating the potential for human suffering.  They suggest 
that this shows Israel was not concerned with making sure the attacks were 
  
 46. Id. 
 47. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 4. 
 48. Id. 
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as narrowly drawn as could be, causing as few unnecessary casualties as 
possible.  Although Israel could argue that is why it employed the use of 
new precision-guided tank shells, which use GPS coordinates, this leads to 
yet another fulfillment of Article 51(4)(c) — namely that the weapon 
“strike[s] military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without 
distinction.”49
The IDF did not properly take into consideration the endangering of 
civilian life in its attacks in violation of international law.  The problem 
with white phosphorus is that as much as one tries to target a specific 
location or individual, if the target is in a densely populated area like Gaza, 
can civilian and military objects really be distinguished as Article 51(4)(c) 
requires?  HRW suggests that there is a chance the two can in fact be 
distinguished, but that despite this, Israel went ahead and targeted areas that 
it knew contained civilians — a weighty accusation.  
Human Rights Watch (HRW) military analysts say Israel’s precision-
guided tank shells are so accurate that they can be fired into a window 
from a distance of a mile (1.5 km). Given the numerous reports during 
OCL of tank shells being fired directly into Palestinian homes, Amnesty 
International and HRW suspect that IDF soldiers routinely targeted any 
home or building where signs of movement were detected by their tank’s 
vision system. Such a blanket open fire policy could be illegal under 
international law.50
Additionally, at the UNRWA compound that was hit, five senior 
employees repeatedly contacted the IDF at Erez and Tel Aviv, begging 
them to stop the shelling.51  UNRWA staff, including director John Ging, 
“had given the IDF the GPS coordinates of all [U.N.] installations in Gaza 
before Operation Cast Lead began.”52  UNRWA Gaza Field Administration 
Officer Scott Anderson was among the employees asking the IDF to stop.53
Anderson, a retired U.S. Army Officer, said that he knew “in the [U.S.] 
Army, it would not take that long to get the artillery fire to stop.”54  One can 
only conclude based on the above mentioned facts, that the IDF did not 
differentiate between civilians and military targets — that it even 
specifically chose to ignore warnings by international organizations that the 
IDF was about to hit premises clear of military and full of civilians.  Such 
actions cannot be labeled anything but indiscriminate and hence a violation 
 49. Protocol I, supra note 45.
 50. The Israeli Arsenal Deployed Against Gaza During Operation Cast Lead, J.
PALESTINE STUD., Spring 2009, at 175, 181. 
 51. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 45. 
 52. Id. at 45. 
 53. Id. at 45. 
 54. Id. at 43, 45.  
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of the First Protocol to the Geneva Convention.  This shows that even if 
white phosphorus use is legal, the way in which it was used was illegal.        
2. 1907 Hague Regulations  
The Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land was adopted with the goal of refining the laws of war to limit war’s 
negative impacts.55  The Convention encompasses a wide range of topics, 
from prisoners of war to the recognition of relief societies.  Chapter I of 
Section II, though, looks specifically at the “[m]eans of injuring the enemy, 
sieges, and bombardments.”56  Within this Chapter is a section entitled 
“Special Prohibitions,” addressing actions such as treachery, killing those 
who have surrendered, and abuse of flags and uniform.57  Most importantly 
is Part (e), which says that it is “especially forbidden” to “employ arms, 
projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering.”58
It is widely accepted that the effect of white phosphorus when coming in 
contact with human skin, can be deadly.  Israel’s own Ministry of Health 
put together a report, entitled “Exposure to White Phosphorus,” on the 
effect of white phosphorus as the attacks were underway and acknowledged 
“that burns on less than 10 percent of the body can be fatal because of 
damage to the liver, kidneys and heart.”59  The Report continues, stating that 
whether a person comes into physical contact with the white phosphorus, or 
if the person inhales or swallows it, the result is a “systemic poisoning” that 
can lead to death.60
Part (e) forbids the use of materials that are “calculated to cause 
unnecessary suffering.”61  Did Israel intentionally use white phosphorus to 
cause harm to civilians?  Was the suffering unnecessary?  Determining 
whether Israel specifically used white phosphorus because it knew the 
effects it would have on civilians is a difficult task.  Generally, the IDF 
repeatedly air-bursted white phosphorus over populated areas from 155mm 
artillery, and this in itself is enough to show that unnecessary suffering 
would result given the densely populated area.  However, human rights 
organizations focused on a specific incident within Operation Cast Lead that 
they felt shows Israel knew the effect of white phosphorus and intentionally 
 55. Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277 [hereinafter 
Hague Convention IV].  The introduction to the Convention states that it is “important . . . to 
revise the general laws and customs of war, either with a view to defining them with greater 
precision or to confining them within such limits as would mitigate their severity as far as 
possible.”  Id.
 56. Id. § 2301. 
 57. Id. § 2302. 
 58. Id.
 59. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 1, 11; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra
note 17, at 10.  
 60. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 11–12.  
 61. Hague Convention IV, supra note 55, at 61. 
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used it.  This incident is the attack on the UNRWA compound on January 
15, 2009.62  UNRWA stated that its officials repeatedly spoke with IDF 
officers the morning of the attack on the UNWRA compound, asking them 
to stop the firing because the attacks were getting closer to the compound 
and civilians were sheltered there.  Needless to say, the IDF continued their 
plan and hit the compound that afternoon.63  Additionally, the United 
Nations provided the IDF with the GPS coordinates of all of its facilities in 
Gaza, including the school that it struck, wounding twelve and killing two 
young brothers.64  After noting that all GPS coordinates had been relayed to 
the IDF, UNRWA spokesman Christopher Gunness said, “When you have a 
direct hit into the third floor of a U.N. school, there has to be an 
investigation to see if a war crime has been committed.”65
Was the suffering unnecessary?  Was this the only method the IDF could 
employ to carry out its mission?  The reality is that Israel itself 
manufactured a much less harmful alternative smokescreen that does not 
burn anything and everything it encounters, as white phosphorus does.  
However, Israel intentionally chose to launch white phosphorus upon Gazan 
targets, including the school area and the U.N. compound.  Israel was 
clearly on notice that it was targeting buildings or areas with or near a 
significant amount of civilians, using a material that undoubtedly caused 
unnecessary suffering.  Therefore, there is a strong case that Israel did 
indeed commit a war crime under the Hague Convention by its intentional 
use of white phosphorus in Operation Cast Lead. 
3. 1907 Hague Protocol III of the Convention on Certain 
Conventional Weapons 
The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (“CCW”), short for 
the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain 
Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious 
or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, also focuses on protecting civilians in 
addition to military personnel, and Protocol III specifically addresses and 
prohibits the use of incendiary weapons.66  The Protocol defines an 
incendiary weapons as one that is “primarily designed to set fire to objects 
or to cause burn injury to persons through the action of flame, heat or a 
combination thereof, produced by a chemical reaction of a substance 
delivered on the target.”67  Determining whether a weapon is considered to 
 62. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 41. 
 63. Id. at 3.  
 64. Id. at 4, 48. 
 65. Id. at 48. 
 66. Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons 
[Protocol III to the CCW], Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 171, 19 I.L.M. 1534, entered into 
force Dec. 2, 1983. 
 67. Id.
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be an incendiary weapon therefore, turns to its purpose and effect — the 
two go hand in hand. 
Israel acceded to the CCW but has not ratified Protocol III.68  As a non-
signatory to the Protocol, Israel does not have a treaty obligation and hence 
technically can use incendiary weapons.  However, Israel’s actions are still 
covered by international law, and Israel can be held accountable for 
violating other principles of international law.  But even more so, yet 
another question arises — whether that provision of the Convention can be 
considered a customary norm or a principle of international law, hence 
binding Israel regardless of its status with the CCW. 
The crux of the argument turns to an assessment of whether white 
phosphorus is an incendiary weapon, one that is “primarily designed to set 
fire to objects or to cause burn injury to persons through the action of 
flame,” or if instead it is strictly to light the sky for the IDF soldiers, the 
effects of burning humans being purely accidental, and what many may call, 
collateral damage.  Even if a weapon is not designed to burn victims but this 
is a necessary and consistent effect of its use, does the weapon fall under the 
CCW?  The spokesman for the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical 
Weapons (“OPCW”), an organization that polices the Chemical Weapons 
Convention, said with certainty that the CCW covers white phosphorus.69
This is a logical conclusion given the documented effects of white 
phosphorus on humans, as discussed previously in Section II(B).  Israel is 
likely to argue that the primary purpose is to light the sky and nothing more.  
However, given both the physical effects of the weapon, the inability to 
limit the scope of its impact, and the fact that people like the spokesman for 
the OPCW support such a conclusion, white phosphorus is an incendiary 
weapon.  Israel’s strongest argument is that it has not ratified Protocol III 
and is hence not bound.  Logistically speaking, this is a valid defense.  The 
only way Israel can be indirectly liable for violating the provisions under 
this Convention is if the use of incendiary weapons is prohibited under 
international law.   
Unlike Israel, the United States ratified the CCW on March 24, 1995,70
and only one day after President Barack Obama was sworn in as President, 
the United States ratified Protocol III of the CCW on January 21, 2009.71
However, the Convention only governs white phosphorus use and not its 
sale.  The United States did not use white phosphorus in this conflict and 
only sold it to Israel.  Therefore, both Israel and the United States are not 
 68. CCW Protocol III Party States, Wikimedia Commons, 
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:CCW_Protocol_III_Party_States.PNG. 
 69. David Charter, Michael Evans & Richard Beeston, Phosphorus Was Used for 
Fallujah Bombs, U.S. Admits, TIMES ONLINE, Nov. 17, 2005, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/ 
tol/news/world/iraq/article591095.ece. 
 70. Press Release, Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Dep’t of State, U.S. Joins Four 
Laws of War Treaties (Jan. 23, 2009) (on file with author). 
 71. Id.
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liable under the CCW.  Nevertheless, this recent ratification of Protocol III 
signifies a shift in the United States’ position towards such weapons.  This 
could foretell not only a change in the U.S. position towards incendiary 
weapons use, but also their manufacture and export — perhaps even a 
narrowing of U.S. arms export laws and controls.     
4. 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention 
The Chemical Weapons Convention was formulated to prevent states 
from maintaining chemical weapons in their arsenals.72  Implementation and 
compliance with the Convention is overseen by the Organization for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (“OPCW”), an organization 
headquartered at the Hague that was formed specifically under the CWC to 
“conduct verification activities as provided by the Convention” and to 
“organize consultations and co-operation among the Member States.”73
Currently there are 188 state parties that have signed and ratified the 
Convention, including the United States and Israel.74
Under Article I(1)(a), state parties to the CWC undertake to “never under 
any circumstances . . . develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or 
retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical 
weapons to anyone.”75  Furthermore, the Convention defines what it 
considers to be “toxic chemicals,” namely chemicals “which through its 
chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation 
or permanent harm to humans or animals.”76  Put simply, state parties 
cannot make, produce, or keep weapons that harm or kill humans or animals 
given their chemical nature. 
This leads to the important question of whether white phosphorus is 
considered a chemical weapon under the Convention.  There is yet to be 
issued a clear-cut answer to this for two reasons.  First, the focus of the 
Convention is ensuring compliance (verification) rather than addressing 
 72. THE NEW CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION: IMPLEMENTATION AND PROSPECTS 2
(Professor M. Bothe, et al., eds. 1998) [hereinafter IMPLEMENTATION AND PROSPECTS]. 
 73. Id. at 5.   
 74. Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, OPCW Member States, 
http://www.opcw.org/nc/about-opcw/member-states/?tx_opcwmemberstate_pi1% 
5BsortField%5D=0&tx_opcwmemberstate_pi1%5BsortReverse%5D=0&tx_opcwmembersta
te_pi1%5Bpointer%5D=1 (last visited Feb. 2, 2010).  
 75. Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Article I. General 
Obligations, http://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention/articles/article-i-general-
obligations/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2010). 
 76. Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Article II. Definition and 
Criteria, http://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention/articles/article-ii-definitions-
and-criteria/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2010); see also Andrew Buncombe & Solomon Hughes, The 
Fog of War: White Phosphorus, Fallujah, and Some Burning Questions, THE INDEP. WORLD,
Nov. 15, 2005, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/the-fog-of-war-white-
phosphorus-fallujah-and-some-burning-questions-515345.html. 
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conflicts or issues that arise the step before that, such as whether a chemical 
can be categorized as a chemical weapon despite not being on the existing 
lists (‘schedules’)77 of prohibited chemicals.78  The lists are not exhaustive 
because many chemicals have multiple purposes, many of which are legal, 
and an outright ban would thus be inappropriate.79  Secondly, the language 
in Article II is rather general, and scholars have gone so far as to say “the 
abstract logic” of the definition of ‘chemical weapons’ is “impeccable,” 
noting that “the concrete application will be very difficult.”80  It is the 
general and abstract nature of the definition of “chemical weapons” that 
leads to murky waters when categorizing white phosphorus.  If issues are 
not resolved by the dispute settlement mechanism provided by the CWC, 
the Conference of States Parties and the Executive Council of the OPCW 
can each request an advisory opinion from the International Court of 
Justice.81
On one side of the debate is the argument that when used to create a 
smokescreen, white phosphorus (“WP”) is not prohibited under the 
Convention.  “According to the OPCW spokesman, the CWC prohibits the 
use of WP munitions where the toxic properties of WP are ‘specifically 
intended to be used as a weapon.’”82  A scholar identified the relevant 
question as “[w]hether the harmful effects of fire and smoke produced by 
WP munitions constitute ‘chemical action on life processes’ in the CWC’s 
definition of a toxic chemical.”83  On the other side are proponents of the 
position that white phosphorus can indeed be considered a chemical 
weapon, depending on its specific use.   
 77. Currently there are three schedules, Schedules 1–3, listing what the CWC 
currently considers ‘toxic chemicals’ and their precursors.  Organisation for the Prohibition 
of Chemical Weapons, Schedules of Chemicals, http://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-
convention/annex-on-chemicals/b-schedules-of-chemicals/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2010). 
 78. IMPLEMENTATION AND PROSPECTS, supra note 72, at 4, 6.  “[T]he question of the 
legal evaluation of the facts thus ascertained and measures to redress non-compliance are 
only regulated in a fragmentary manner. The assumption underlying this approach seems to 
be that the existence and use of the procedures for ascertaining facts will be sufficient . . . .”  
Id. at 6.     
 79. Id. at 4. 
 80. Id. at 3. 
 81. Id. at 5, 12.  The Conference of States Parties is comprised of representatives 
from each of the countries that are parties to the Convention, and the Executive Council 
consists of “[forty-one] members being elected on the basis of equitable geographic 
distribution and other criteria, in particular the importance of the chemical industry of the 
country concerned.” Id. at 5. 
 82. International Humanitarian Law Research Initiative, Program on Humanitarian 
Policy and Conflict Research, Harvard University, IHL Primer #5 – White Phosphorus 
Munitions, July 2009, http://ihl.ihlresearch.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=page. 
viewpage&pageid=2105. 
 83. Id.
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Professor Paul Rogers, of the University of Bradford’s department of 
peace studies, said white phosphorus could be considered a chemical 
weapon if deliberately aimed at civilians . . . .  ‘It is not counted under the 
chemical weapons convention in its normal use but, although it is a matter 
of legal niceties, it probably does fall into the category of chemical 
weapons if it is used for this kind of purpose directly against people.’84
This latter position seems to imply that there is an intent requirement — 
that there must be a showing of an intention to harm civilians with the use 
of white phosphorus.  Proving such a thing might be rather difficult, but 
HRW and Amnesty International have both constructed their own theories 
on why, given the time of day, frequency, and nature of the phosphorus 
bombings, Israel intended to harm civilians, or at least to disregard the need 
for their safety.85  Therefore, if the OPCW accepts that white phosphorus 
has harmful effects on life processes, then it must indeed be categorized as a 
chemical weapon.   
Finally, the Convention addresses injured states by the inappropriate acts 
of another state party, but the question remains, what about non-parties, or 
even non-state actors such as the Occupied Palestinian Territories?  A state 
party that is injured by acts that violate the Convention is permitted to “not 
comply with one or more of its obligations towards the said State” 
according to Article 11,86 but non-state actors are left in the dark.  They 
cannot sign the agreement since they are not states, and are hence left 
without certain safeguards.  The only repercussions for a state’s improper 
actions towards a non-state actor seem to be from the OPCW itself.    
5. International Law Commission’s Articles on Responsibility 
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts  
The previous international legal documents all address the use of certain 
types of weapons in wars and the responsibilities states have towards 
civilians.  The International Law Commission’s Articles on Responsibility 
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts differs slightly in the sense that 
this agreement discusses the responsibility a state other than the primary 
acting state has when aiding that primary state in illegal acts.  The Articles 
would be relevant in holding accountable other states that aided Israel in its 
attacks on Gaza, should those acts be conclusively found to violate 
international law.  
Article 16 says that:  
 84. US Used White Phosphorus in Iraq, BBC NEWS, Nov. 16, 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4440664.stm. 
 85. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 
17. 
 86. IMPLEMENTATION AND PROSPECTS, supra note 72, at 452–53. 
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A State which aids or assists another State in the commission of an 
internationally wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible for 
doing so if: (a) that State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of 
the internationally wrongful act; and (b) the act would be internationally 
wrongful if committed by the State.87
In other words, if the United States aided another country by providing it 
with the means to commit the wrongful act, and if the United States would 
be considered to have committed a wrongful act if it had engaged in the 
same conduct as that other state that it helped, then the United States is 
considered to be internationally responsible for the primary actor’s conduct.  
Assuming that Israel’s conduct was in fact internationally wrongful, based 
on the above-mentioned conventions and treaties, the question is whether 
the United States was aware that Israel’s conduct was wrongful, and 
secondly if the United States engaged in the same conduct, whether it would 
also be considered to have engaged in a wrongful act.   
This Paper takes the position that the United States was on notice of the 
illegality of the use of white phosphorus in such a manner given its past 
involvement with phosphorus in Iraq, hence fulfilling the two requirements 
of Article 16.  Although not all incendiary weapons are chemical weapons, 
the use of either one is very controversial.  That is why the United States, 
much like Israel in this more recent episode in Gaza, initially denied using 
white phosphorus in Fallujah, Iraq.88  Then it said it used white phosphorus 
“very sparingly in Fallujah, for illumination purposes,”89 and finally later 
admitted firing white phosphorus at the insurgency, used as an “incendiary 
weapon against enemy combatants.”90  While attacks were underway in 
Gaza, an IDF spokesman “told CNN: ‘I can tell you with certainty that 
white phosphorus is absolutely not being used.’”91  Only a week later, Israel 
started defending itself saying that it uses weapons only in manners that 
conform to the requirements of international law,92 and once the attacks 
were complete, the IDF issued a statement admitted firing around 200 white 
 87. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 17, at 21 (internal quotations omitted). 
 88. UK Used White Phosphorus in Iraq, BBC NEWS, Nov. 16, 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/4441822.stm (“The US State Department 
originally denied it had been used in last year’s assault on Falluja, a stronghold for Sunni 
insurgents west of Baghdad.”).  
 89. Did the U.S. Use “Illegal” Weapons in Fallujah?, U.S. Department of State, Jan. 
27, 2005, available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2005/050127-
fallujah.htm. 
 90. UK Used White Phosphorus in Iraq, supra note 88 (“Pentagon spokesman Lt Col 
Barry Venable said the substance had been used as an ‘incendiary weapon against enemy 
combatants’.”); see also US Used White Phosphorus in Iraq, supra note 84. 
 91. Ben Wedeman, Group Accuses Israel of Firing White Phosphorus into Gaza,
CNN.com, Jan. 12, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/01/12 
/white.phosphorus/index.html. 
 92. Id.
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phosphorus artillery shells in northern Gaza.93  And much like Israel today, 
the United States defended itself by first saying that it had not signed any 
international treaty restricting white phosphorus use, and then by stating that 
white phosphorus is an incendiary weapon rather than a chemical weapon.94
Therefore, it held that its use of white phosphorus was permissible.95  In the 
end though, the international community was extremely critical of U.S. 
action in Fallujah, accusing the United States of using white phosphorus 
against humans rather than just for illumination purposes and as a 
smokescreen. Why were Israel and the United States avoiding admitting 
their use of white phosphorus if they truly felt the chemical and the manner 
in which it was used was legal?  Their actions alone seem to imply 
something.   
As the abovementioned conventions show, the permissible uses of 
incendiary weapons are very limited, and some treaties, such as the 
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, ban their use.  After looking 
at the three international agreements collectively, it becomes clear that 
white phosphorus use is permissible in open areas. 
[B]ut air-bursting white phosphorus over populated areas is unlawful 
because it places civilians at unnecessary risk and its wide dispersal of 
burning wedges may amount to an indiscriminate attack.  White 
phosphorus can also be used as a weapon against hardened military 
targets, such as bunkers.  However, it may not be used as an anti-personnel 
weapon when a weapon less likely to cause unnecessary suffering is 
available.96   
Having established that the United States’s use of white phosphorus in 
Fallujah was illegal under international law, that the United States’s use was 
very similar to Israel’s use in Gaza, and keeping in mind the permissible 
uses of white phosphorus, one can only conclude that Israel’s use of white 
phosphorus was illegal under international law.  Therefore, any state aiding 
Israel in these illegal actions (1) knowing the illegality of such actions and 
(2) potentially being liable if they had committed those acts themselves 
would be in violation of Article 16 of the International Law Commission’s 
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts.  
 93. The Israeli Arsenal Deployed Against Gaza During Operation Cast Lead, supra 
note 50, at 187.
 94. US Used White Phosphorus in Iraq, supra note 84 (“‘[White phosphorus] was 
used as an incendiary weapon against enemy combatants,’ spokesman Lt Col Barry Venable 
told the BBC . . . .”).
 95. At the time this statement was made, the United States was not a signatory to 
Protocol III of the CCW prohibiting the use of incendiary weapons.  However, the United 
States signed it on January 21, 2009, and therefore, white phosphorus use by the United 
States would not be permissible.  
 96. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 2–3. 
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The United States fulfills both of these elements and hence is in violation 
of Article 16.  First, the United States was well aware of the illegality of 
white phosphorus use in certain circumstances, primarily because of the fact 
that the United States itself used the chemical and faced international 
criticism after such a decision.  Secondly, although not a signatory to 
Protocol III at the time, the United States was party to a number of relevant 
conventions and is currently a signatory to Protocol III.  If the United States 
engaged in white phosphorus use in a densely populated area like Gaza, it 
too would be engaging in an internationally wrongful act under international 
law.  Hence, the United States is responsible for aiding Israel in that it sold 
the weapons that made it possible to commit the acts in the first place. 
B. Conclusion Regarding International Law  
Based on all the evidence compiled regarding IDF use of white 
phosphorus, human rights organizations are in agreement that Israel violated 
international humanitarian law.  HRW concluded that the IDF “repeatedly 
exploded white phosphorus munitions in the air over populated areas, 
killing and injuring civilians, and damaging civilian structures.”97  It found 
that Israel could have used other non-lethal alternatives, such as “smoke 
shells produced by an Israeli company,” if Israel’s use of the white 
phosphorus was in fact only as an obscurant.98  HRW also pointed to IDF’s 
“more effective precision weapons designed to minimize collateral damage, 
such as the GBU-39, a 250-pound (113 kg) guided bomb.”99  However, the 
IDF consistently and repeatedly air-bursted white phosphorus, “especially 
where no Israeli forces were on the ground,” which “strongly suggests that 
the IDF was not using the munition for its obscurant qualities, but rather for 
its incendiary effect.”100  The use of white phosphorus, HRW continued, 
“violated international humanitarian law (the laws of war), which requires 
taking all feasible precautions to avoid civilian harm and prohibits 
indiscriminate attacks.”101  Similarly, after its own extensive investigation, 
Amnesty International stated that it “found indisputable evidence that Israeli 
forces used white phosphorus, which has a highly incendiary effect,” and 
that it considers the use of white phosphorus in this manner as “a form of 
indiscriminate attack [that] amounts to a war crime.”102  Given the 
aforementioned international laws and their application to the evidence 
attained, these organizations’ conclusions seem well-founded. 
Sara Roy, senior research analyst at the Center for Middle Eastern 
Studies at Harvard University, said, “While it is important to pay attention 
 97. Id. at 1. 
 98. Id. at 1. 
 99. Id. at 14. 
 100. Id. at 5. 
 101. Id. at 1. 
 102. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 17, at 5, 10. 
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to these weapons, the majority of Gazans are being killed by typical military 
operations.  I am a scholar and I use words carefully, and this seems like a 
massacre.”103
IV. U.S. MANUFACTURER OR GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT
A. Whose White Phosphorus? 
Perhaps due to the fact that white phosphorus is a chemical weapon and 
therefore not as widely manufactured as bullets might be, one can easily 
trace the source.  This simply involves looking at the shells that remain after 
the substance has burst over a certain area to identify the serial number and 
make of the bomb.  To determine the source of the white phosphorus used 
in Gaza, HRW and Amnesty International sent teams to investigate on the 
ground to search for such remnants.  HRW, Amnesty International, and 
Reuters photographed and documented white phosphorus remains — both 
actual phosphorus remnants as well as used and unused casings.   
Despite differences in shell sizes, there was one fact that consistently 
surfaced — all the white phosphorus munitions were manufactured in the 
United States.  In fact, the majority of Israeli weaponry is American-
made.104  Although the extent of HRW’s discussion about U.S. involvement 
in Operation Case Lead was to identify the source of the white phosphorus, 
Amnesty International went as far as to say that the United States funded the 
Gaza attacks.105  It provided a detailed listing of the different types of 
weapons used, the sources of the weapons, and took it one step further by 
identifying the amounts and sources of financial military assistance to the 
state of Israel.106  The United States was almost always on top, and at values 
that were ten-fold larger than the next highest provider.107  Amnesty 
International boldly stated that “Israel’s military intervention in the Gaza 
Strip has been equipped to a large extent by [U.S.]-supplied weapons, 
munitions and military equipment paid for with [U.S.] taxpayers’ 
money.”108  The human rights organizations were even able to trace the 
white phosphorous to two specific manufacturers. Many, including 
Amnesty International lawyer Malcolm Smart, have taken the position that 
given the role of the United States as “the major supplier of weapons to 
 103. Marquand, supra note 23. 
 104. Hass, supra note 29 (“By and large, the weaponry that Israel is using in 
American.”); see generally AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 17.  However, Israel is 
also “a significant manufacturer of conventional arms, falling within the top [ten] arms 
exporters in the world.”  Id. at 18.  It “also relies on imports of military equipment, parts and 
technologies” from a number of countries, including the United States, Germany, France, the 
United Kingdom, and Romania.  Id. at 18–20.  
 105. See generally, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 17.  
 106. Id.
 107. Id.   
 108. Id. at 19.  
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Israel, the [United States] has a particular obligation to stop any supply that 
contributes to gross violations of the laws of war and of human rights.”109
Generally speaking, there were over a half-dozen American 
manufacturers of Israeli weapons, including General Dynamics 
Corporation; Alliant; Raytheon; Pine Bluff Arsenal; Hellfire Systems of 
Orlando, a Lockheed Martin/Boeing joint venture, under contract with the 
US Army’s Aviation and Missile Command at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama; 
and Thiokol Aerospace.110  Two of these specifically manufactured white 
phosphorus.  The companies manufacturing or assembling the white 
phosphorus artillery will be identified below with the appropriate 
identifying information.  
1. 155mm White Phosphorus  
Throughout Gaza, HRW and Amnesty International primarily saw and 
photographed 155mm artillery carrier shells.  They all had either the 
markings M825 E1 or M825 A1, markings that are specific and unique to 
U.S.-made munitions.111  Although all white phosphorus shells would 
showcase either of these two markings, there is also a manufacturers code 
engraved in the casing that allows one to identify who produced those 
specific casings.     
Thiokol Aerospace, running Louisiana Army Ammunition Plant, April 1989 
HRW came across white phosphorus shells all from the same source as is 
apparent from the markings on the shells.  They all had the following 
manufacturers code: THS89D112-003 155MM M825E1.  As HRW 
explained:  
THS89D is the manufacturer identification code denoting that the shells 
and contents were produced in April 1989 by Thiokol Aerospace, which 
operated the Louisiana Army Ammunition Plant at the time; 112-003 are 
the interfix and sequence numbers, which denote that several lots of the 
same ammunition were being produced simultaneously; 155mm stands for 
the caliber of the artillery shell. M825E1 is the US military designation for 
an older remanufactured M825 white phosphorus shell that has been 
brought up to the current M825A1 standard.112   
 109. Amnesty Report: Israel Guilty of War Crimes, RIVERSCRAP, Feb. 23, 2009, 
http://riverscrap.typepad.com/home/2009/02/amnesty-report-israel-guilty-of-war-
crimes.html. 
 110. Hass, supra note 29; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 17; HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH, supra note 1. 
 111. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 17, at 7; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra
note 1, at 13, n.5.  
 112. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 13. 
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Therefore, the shells that HRW came across were the older model that had 
faced flight instability.113
Although not stating the specific name of the company — Thiokol 
Aerospace — Amnesty International came across phosphorus shells from 
the same manufacturer, but the newer standard model.  The photographs 
show shells with the markings “M825 A1,” the same shells in pictures of 
IDF stockpiles of white phosphorus shells. 
Pine Bluff Arsenal, 1991 (General Dynamics) 
HRW and Amnesty International photographs also evidenced the use of 
white phosphorus shells produced in September 1991 at Arkansas’ Pine 
Bluff Arsenal.114  The artillery shells showcased the marking “PB-91K018-
035,” indicating Pine Bluff assembly.115  The shells were located on the 
grounds of the UNRWA field operations headquarters compound in Gaza.116
At 10 a.m. on January 15, 2009, six shells hit the compound that at the time 
was sheltering 700 people.117  At least three of the shells contained white 
phosphorus as was apparent by the light green artillery casings,118 and as a 
result of the fires caused by the phosphorus, a massive supply of 
humanitarian aid was destroyed. 119
B. Implications Under International Law 
1. Chemical Weapons Convention 
The United States signed the Chemical Weapons Convention on January 
13, 1993, and ratified it on April 25, 1997.120  Therefore, the United States is 
bound by the obligations imposed upon it by the CWC.  As mentioned 
previously, the CWC bans the use of certain weapons and requires that 
nations destroy or safely store these listed weapons.121  Again, although as 
of yet white phosphorus has not specifically been named as a chemical 
weapon covered by the Convention, I submit that given the harmful effects 
of both white phosphorus and white phosphorus fumes and the inability to 
 113. Id. at 13, n.5. 
 114. Id. at 13 (showcasing a photograph of a white phosphorus shell with the 
inscription “PB-91K018-035”); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 17, at 8; Pine Bluff 
Arsenal, http://www.pba.army.mil/Default.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2010). 
 115. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 17, at 8. 
 116. Id. at 7. 
 117. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 41–42. 
 118. Id. at 41, 43.  
 119. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 17, at 7. Medicine, food, and other items 
were among the supplies destroyed.  Id.
 120. Chemical Weapons Convention Signatories and States-Parties, Arms Control 
Association, http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/cwcsig (last visited Feb. 2, 2010).  
 121. IMPLEMENTATION AND PROSPECTS, supra note 72, at 2. 
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prevent the smoke from reaching and affecting civilian populations, white 
phosphorus is covered under this Convention.  Although the United States 
now publicly rejects white phosphorus as a chemical weapon, U.S. 
intelligence even admitted in 2005 that white phosphorus is indeed a 
chemical weapon.122  Should the OPCW accept white phosphorus as a 
chemical weapon, or even if it just categorizes certain uses of it as chemical 
weapons uses, this would have a significant impact on the United States 
under the International Law Commission’s Articles on Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts.  The United States provided 
weapons to Israel, weapons that had it used itself would result in a 
determination that the United States engaged in wrongful conduct and could 
potentially impose responsibility on the U.S. for supplying the munitions. 
C. U.S. Law Affecting the Manufacturing and Use of Weapons  
In addition to obligations the United States has regarding the 
manufacturing of weapons and use of its own weapons, the United States 
also has in place a number of laws controlling the export of arms and 
foreign assistance.  The United States President overseas decisions 
regarding policy that affects arms trade as well as the issuance of export 
licenses.123  Manufacturers or other parties not following these U.S. laws 
and guidelines can be held accountable for such violations.  Included are the 
U.S. Arms Export Control Act, the Foreign Assistance Act, the U.S. Export 
Administration Act, and the Leahy Law.  The first three of these laws will 
be addressed in light of U.S. white phosphorus shipments to Israel.    
1. U.S. Arms Export Control Act 
Congress passed the U.S. Arms Export Control Act (“AECA”) to give 
the U.S. President the authority “to control the export of defense articles and 
services.”124  Section 4 of the AECA authorizes the supply of U.S. military 
equipment and training only for lawful purposes of internal security, 
“legitimate self-defense,” or participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations 
or other operations consistent with the U.N. Charter.125  Furthermore, 
§2791(a)(C) requires consideration of “whether, and the extent to which, 
such sale might contribute to an arms race, aid in the development of 
weapons of mass destruction, support international terrorism, increase the 
possibility of outbreak or escalation of conflict, or prejudice the 
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development of bilateral or multilateral arms control or nonproliferation 
agreements or other arrangements.”126
It is clear from these provisions that the U.S. government puts at least 
some weight on the manner in which its munitions sales and exports to 
foreign countries may affect world relations.  However, how effective are 
these “considerations”?  Are they suggestions or is there a repercussion for 
failing to realize wrongful end-use of U.S. munitions?  A thorough look at 
the AECA shows that there seem to be no provisions directly penalizing a 
failure of consideration of situations under section 2791.  Generally, 
criminal or civil penalties are applied when a manufacturer fails to follow 
procedural requirements, such as obtaining a license or registering its 
company before engaging in arms sales and export.127  However, sections 
2753 and 2754 together provide a requirement that if there is any suggestion 
or potential evidence that U.S. munitions have been used in a manner not 
permitted under section 2754, the President must look into the matter and 
report to Congress within thirty days.128
Congressman Dennis Kucinich took initiative and on January 5, 2009, 
while attacks were still underway, sent a letter to the Bush Administration’s 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice “request[ing] an examination of 
Israel’s compliance with the provisions of the [AECA].”129  As of yet, there 
is no record of a response.  What is the penalty for failing to fulfill this 
requirement? What is the next step after such a report is issued? These are 
questions that should and must be addressed by U.S. Representatives in 
assessing our nation’s arms controls.  The lack of response certainly seems 
discouraging in terms of ensuring accountability, but there are other 
potential routes.  
The second method is to research and see whether the manufacturers, 
Thiokol Aerospace or General Dynamics, failed to satisfy any of the 
procedural requirements necessary in their registration or application for 
licenses.  Although a more indirect approach, this route succeeded in 
convicting a major corporation, ITT Corporation (“ITT”), and fining it $100 
million for “illegally export[ing] military night vision goggles to China.”130
Although part of the conviction relied on sales to China, hence jeopardizing 
national security, ITT also sold these night vision goggles to Singapore and 
the United Kingdom, both countries allies to the United States.131  So why 
the fine and conviction?  ITT failed to fill out the proper paperwork and 
 126. 22 U.S.C. § 2791(a)(C) (1976). 
 127. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. §2778(c) (1976).  
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2009, http://kucinich.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=108151. 
 130. Drew Cullen, ITT Fined $100m for Shipping Night Vision Goggles to China, THE 
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provide all the necessary information requested under the AECA.132
“According to the [Department of Justice], ITT will be the first major 
defense contractor convicted of a criminal violation of the [AECA].”133
So who would have to bring a lawsuit, and who should be sued if the 
government is in some way associated with the sales?  Although a U.S. 
defense contractor sold the ITT products in the case just mentioned, it was 
the company that was fined.134  This is because the company is the entity 
that failed to follow proper procedures, not the government.  In fact, it was a 
government office, the Office of the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, 
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs in the U.S. Department of State that 
initiated the proceedings against ITT.135  Therefore, should there be a 
procedural failure by Thiokol Aerospace or General Dynamics, even if there 
was government involvement, it is the company in the end that faces the 
penalty.   
This suggests that after the President has the matter looked into under 
section 2753 of the AECA, should even a procedural violation be found, the 
U.S. government could and probably would sue the corporation for its 
violations.  Like Singapore and the United Kingdom, Israel is an ally of the 
United States, but even ally status does not prevent a company from being 
penalized for failure to follow proper U.S. governmental procedures.  An 
investigation into the paperwork and applications of the two companies 
would be crucial to pursuing this second claim, and unfortunately as of now 
this information is not publicly available.  Therefore, the first essential step 
is to begin an investigation into whether there were procedural or 
substantive violations of the AECA.    
A third, yet perhaps less compelling, argument involves section 2780 of 
the AECA, titled “Transactions with Countries Supporting Acts of 
International Terrorism.”136  At first glance, one may ask how Israel would 
be supporting terrorism when it repeatedly asserts its position of fighting 
terrorism.  However, a closer look at the provisions of section 2780 suggest 
that there may be a feasible argument under this section.  This provision 
prohibits “[e]xporting or otherwise providing (by sale, lease or loan, grant, 
or other means), directly or indirectly, any munitions item to a country 
described in subsection (d).”137  Subsection (d) prohibits providing to a 
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Although the acts that took place in Gaza are not what one thinks of 
when thinking of the conventional definition of terrorism, what is relevant is 
how the statute itself defines such acts.  Section 2780(d) continues by 
stating that these acts “include all activities that . . . willfully aid or abet the 
efforts of an individual or group to use, develop, produce, stockpile, or 
otherwise acquire chemical, biological, or radiological weapons.”139  Section 
2780 provides for both a criminal and civil penalty for violating this statute, 
a criminal fine of up to one million and a civil penalty up to $500,000.140
The key to using this argument is first establishing that white phosphorus is 
in fact a chemical weapon.  As mentioned in section III(A)(4) above, there 
is a strong case for arguing that white phosphorus is a chemical weapon, 
and therefore, there is a chance that this approach may succeed, but the most 
likely successful method is the second, procedural approach.    
In other words, there are a number of potential approaches to holding 
either weapons manufacturers liable under the AECA.  The past indicates 
that even Israel could be sanctioned as it was in 1982 “for its misuse of 
American-supplied weapons under the AECA; in that case the Reagan 
Administration suspended the provision of cluster munitions to Israel after 
determining that Israel misused those munitions in its 1982 offensive in 
Lebanon.”141  Whether the result is to prevent U.S. manufacturers from 
making weapons or sanctioning foreign countries by prohibiting them from 
receiving such weapons, it is clear that something needs to prevent further 
misuse of U.S. weapons resulting in the loss of innocents — whether in the 
U.S. or abroad — and the AECA may provide a solution.  
2. Foreign Assistance Act 
The AECA references the Foreign Assistance Act, a law that prohibits 
assisting foreign countries that engage “in a consistent pattern of gross 
violations of internationally recognized human rights.”142  Specifically, 
section 502B states: 
[N]o security assistance may be provided to any country the government 
of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of 
internationally recognized human rights’ which includes ‘acts of torture or 
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged 
detention without charges and trial, causing the disappearance of persons 
 139. § 2780(d). 
 140. § 2780(j)–(k).  
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by the abduction and clandestine detention of those persons, and other 
flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, or the security of person.143
The AECA conditions military sales “only when they are consistent with . . 
. the purposes of the foreign assistance program of the United States as 
embodied in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.”144  The National Lawyers 
Guild sent a team to Gaza to assess the impact of the attacks and whether 
U.S. law was violated by the events of Operation Cast Lead.145  Their report 
explained that 
The AECA includes a provision that “sales [of military equipment] be 
approved only when they are consistent with . . . the purposes of the 
foreign assistance program of the United States as embodied in the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961.”  In order to serve these purposes, the AECA 
allows the United States to provide defense articles and services to a 
foreign country only for one or more of four following purposes, (i) 
internal security, (ii) legitimate self-defense, (iii) to permit participation in 
regional or collective arrangements consistent with the United Nations 
Charter or when requested by the United Nations for international 
peacekeeping, and (iv) to assist undeveloped friendly foreign countries to 
develop public infrastructure. In order to receive assistance under the 
AECA, foreign countries are required to agree not to use military 
assistance for purposes other than those enumerated unless the consent of 
the President of the United States has been obtained.146
Israel claims that its actions were for defense purposes — within the 
limitations of the Foreign Assistance Act.  Therefore, the key is determining 
whether using white phosphorus in a manner that affected a large number of 
civilians in a high-density population area is a ‘legitimate self-defense’ 
initiative.  Taking into consideration the principle of proportionality, a 
customary international law, a country can defend itself but only if its 
response is proportional to the injury it experienced.147  Given that Israel 
suffered ten deaths from Gazan attacks in a span of six years and responded 
by killing over 1,000 people in approximately three weeks, using incendiary 
weapons hardly seems proportional. 148  Under these facts, it is hard to argue 
that Israel’s actions fell within what may be deemed legitimate self-defense.  
This would mean the United States assisted Israel in actions not within the 
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scope of the Foreign Assistance Act.  Given this conclusion, under the Act 
any assistance to Israel should cease immediately.149
3. U.S. Export Administration Act  
The U.S. Export Administration Act makes an exception to the 
limitations presented in the Foreign Assistance Act, permitting security 
assistance “if the President certifies that ‘extraordinary circumstances’ 
exist.”150  There is not much to say here other than the fact that there was 
clearly no extraordinary circumstance involved.  According to the Israel 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel has been encountering home-made 
Qassam rockets fired by the Palestinians since 2001.151  Between 2001 and 
2007, a total of ten lives were lost.152  In the three-week attack on Gaza, 
over 1,000 Palestinians were killed.153  What the extraordinary circumstance 
is that would justify indiscriminate use of incendiary weapons remains a 
mystery.     
V. CONCLUSION
In the end, the goal is better world relations between countries and 
security for one’s own nation.  When one country is using weapons, 
chemicals, or whatever you choose to call the substance, the fact of the 
matter is that it is burning the bodies of innocent civilians, and this cannot 
be good for the promotion of peace.  When referring to America’s use of 
white phosphorus in Fallujah, Iraq, Kathy Kelly with an anti-war group 
called Voices of the Wilderness said: 
If the United States wants to promote security for this generation and the 
next, it should build relationships with these countries. If the United States 
uses conventional or non-conventional weapons, in civilian neighourhoods 
[sic], that melt people’s bodies down to the bone, it will leave these people 
seething.  We should think on this rather than arguing about whether we 
can squeak such weapons past the Geneva Conventions and international 
accords.154
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The same can be said about the United States manufacturing the 
weapons, even if it is not the one using them.  One cannot ignore the 
message relayed with the United States on the one hand calling for a peace 
plan between Israelis and Palestinians, and on the other, serving as the 
largest supplier of weapons to Israel.  Palestinians walk in the streets and 
find the remains of bombs or other weapons with the words “Made in the 
U.S.A.” emblazoned on the front.  If morals do not have a place in this 
debate, countries should and must at least anticipate the effect of their 
manufacturing of weapons used in conflicts around the world and assess 
how that can affect their own national security.     
Finally, this Paper proposes that in order to further efforts to protect 
civilians in times of war and given numerous less harmful alternatives, an 
outright ban on the use of white phosphorus as a smokescreen or weapon in 
general should be administered, whether in densely populated areas or 
otherwise.  Currently, tear gas is banned in the CWC but phosphorus, a 
chemical that burns humans right down to the bone, remains unlisted.155
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